@device(x2700) @make[Report] @Majorheading{Chapter 3} In the debate which took place in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century on the provision of a state pension, the poverty of elderly women was frequently specifically noted. One of the objections raised to introducing a contributory pension scheme was that it would fail to meet the needs of women. The previous chapter demonstrated that in the 1960s and 1970s elderly women were still the poorest of the elderly. However the contributory national insurance retirement pension scheme was not the primary cause of this. The gloomy forecasts about contributory schemes do not appear to have been borne out. This chapter explores why this happened. We shall find that the answer is to be found in the provision made for married, and previously married, women through their husbands. In addition special rules were added to assist women when their marriages ended before retirement age. It will be argued here that this solution was not the only one possible, that it was not inevitable and that it was developed gradually as a response to specific problems as they arose. However while one problem was solved, a number of new ones were created. It will be argued later that there have been as a result serious disadvantages for women. The present chapter looks at the development of provision for women primarily as dependents. The next will look at the additional rules which were also found to be necessary and the drawbacks of such provision. @section{The Pensions Debate 1895-1908} The Royal Commission on the Aged Poor (Aberdare Commission) reporting in 1895, considered both contributory and non-contributory pension proposals, as well as looking at Poor Law provision. It noted that more elederly women than men were in receipt of poor relief, although the women were more lokely than the women to receive 'outdoor relief'. Women in receipt of relief were thought to be more deserving than men : @i[ There is no doubt that cases where pauperism is due clearly to misfortune are very much more frequent among women than among men, partly owing to the unequal conditions under which they have often to compete in the labour market, and partly ....because they are less financially responsible. {1} ] The major objection to contributory schemes was felt to be that those who became destitute in old age were those who either would not or could not contribute. Here the majority of the Commissioners found common ground with Henry Broadhurst MP who submitted a minority report supporting a non-contributory scheme. Joseph Chamberlain gave evidence on his contributory proposals, but conceded that this would not provide a universal solution. However he believed that the poorest often died before reaching old age and argued that those who lived on to receive relief were often those who had been in steady, sometimes skilled work. {2} This ignores the position of women who did frequently survive. Contrary evidence was presented by Miss Amy Hurlston who argued that working women could not afford the contributions proposed by Chamberlain. Her evidence is referred to at some length in the Report itself which suggests that it carried some weight in the rejection of the main contributory schemes which were presented. Schemes for voluntary contribution often rested on payments being made at post offices. Although the non employed would not therefore have been excluded it was considered unlikely that those not already contributing to an existing savings arrangement would join in such a scheme. In 1898 the Rothschild Committee, looking at voluntary contribution schemes only, rejected all the schemes presented to it. @i[ We can hardly for the benefit of so limited a section of the community, recommend the Government to establish a pension system which must be extremely difficult and costly to administer, which excludes the really destitute, and those who, owing to broken health and misfortune, or want of employment, or a lower rate of wage earning, can make no contribution, and which would be open to innumerable fraudulent claims difficult, often impossible, to detect.{3}] The 1899 Select Committee concentrated on the terms on which a limited non- contributory pension might be granted. It had ruled out schemes which would require compulsory contributions from an early age, on the two grounds that there would be benefit to the elderly for many years and that @i[ It would be opposed to the wishes of the very class whom we desire to assist.{4}] The Committee rejected a suggestion that to qualify for a non-contributory pension the applicant should have belonged to a friendly society, or otherwise exercised a definite kind or saving or thrift because this would exclude many applicants, especially women. {5} One of the most influential campaigners for a non-contributory scheme was Charles Booth. He used the example of women as one of his arguments against contributory schemes: @i[ None of the contributory schemes touch the case of women to any marked extent, women being seldom financially independant to a degree enabling them to contribute to an insurance fund.{6}] The National Committee for Promoting Old Age Pensions, formed in 1899, criticised schemes to give state aid to Friendly Society pension plans @i[ Because a large number of the worst paid of all workers, namely women, are excluded from many Friendly Societies because they are women, and from many others because their wages are too low for them to afford the subscription ... In a word, because it would mean taxing the ill paid labourer to pension the well-paid artisan, taxing the weak to pension the strong, taxing women to pension men, taxing the many to give a privilege to the few.{7}] It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the apparent failure of the contributory scheme to meet the needs of women was the major consideration leading to the adoption of a non-contributory scheme. Bentley Gilbert suggests that the opposition to the friendly societies to the competition of a state contributory scheme effectively killed the contributory pension proposals in the 1890s {8}. Pat Williams points also to the reluctance of the Treasury to finance the necessary administrative structure {9}, and to the domination of the pensions campaign by the Labour movement campaign for a non-contributory scheme. Labour movement opposition to a contributory scheme was based on the fact that it would be unlikely to help the existing elderly poor and that it would place an extra burden on working people, among whom women were thought to be particularly unlikely to be able to contribute. The views of organised labour were important because by 1906 labour was in a position to exert political pressure on the Government. As well as the 'labour' men sitting as Liberals in the 1906 Parliament, there were 29 representatives of the new Labour Party. In 1907 the Liberal Government lost two by-elections to Labour. This influenced both the decision to do something on pensions, and in particular to adopt a non- contributory scheme, although a very much more limited one than the campaigners had been urging. Nevertheless the position of women would appear to have been a reasonably important consideration. In speaking to the Old Age Pensions Bill at its Second Reading in 1908 Lloyd George gave this first place among his objections to a contributory scheme: @i[ Let me give now two or three considerations why, in my judgment, a contributory scheme is impossible in this country. In the first place it would practically exclude women from its benefits. Out of the millions of members of friendly societies there is but a small proportion, comparatively, of women. Another consideration is that the vast majority are not earning anything and cannot pay their contributions. The second reason is that the majority of working men are unable to deflect from their weekly earnings a sufficient sum of money to make adequate provision for old age in addition to that which they are now making for sickness, infirmity and unemployment.{10}] Yet in less than 20 years a contributory scheme was introduced and seen as politically feasible. We shall now consider what has happened to make this possible. @section{ Explanations for the introduction of a contributory pension scheme in 1925} The existence of the 1908 scheme in itself made it easier for a non-contributory scheme to be considered. It ensured that the very poorest of the elderly were provided for, at least from age 70. Secondly the insurance principle had been accepted with the introduction of health and unemployment insurance in 1911. This was however specifically to provide an income for short periods of time only to those who would normally be in work. In contrast pensions might well be paid for several years, which was normally felt to require several years of advance contributions. The cost of a contributory scheme was reduced by introducing it to cover a 5 year period (age 65 to 70) with the additional cost of allowing those who qualified to receive the non-contributory pension at age 70 without a means test. This in turn enabled the contribution conditions to be relatively easy to fulfil for those normally in employment. The idea of lifetime contributions, which was seen in the earlier pensions debate as creating difficulties, was abandoned. However this still left the question of how to cover those women who reached old age without a recent employment record, usually because they were married. The 1908 scheme paid pensions to people with low incomes, and recent employment had no relevance. Married women not in employment were a substantial proportion of the female population in the 1920s. Few married women were in a position to meet even the fairly low contribution requirements of the 1925 Act. In 1921 only 8.73% of married women were in employment. With the benefit of hindsight we can see that this was to be the low point in rates of married women's employment, with there being a slow rise in the years before World War II and a sharp rise thereafter. At the time, however, the 1921 position could be seen as a confirmation of a trend against married women working {11}. There had been a fall in the proportion of married women working between 1911 and 1921, from 9.63% to 8.73%, although the total numbers of married women actually rose. It has been estimated that in 1851 as many as one in four married women may have been in full-time employment {12}. Unfortunately the 1901 census tables did not distinguish between unmarried and widowed women. However a Board of Trade Report in 1894 {13} made an estimate of the minimum number of married and widowed women in employment by comparing the 1891 census totals for "single women" and "occupied women". The excess of the latter over the former was assumed to give the minimum numbers of occupied wives and widows. By age-group the percentages are as follows: @i[ Wives and Widows as % of all occupied women] @i[ Age 23 - 35 1.24% 35 - 45 34.36% 45 - 55 51.04% 55 - 65 54.83% 65 and over 32.71%] The same report demonstrated that the employment of married women varied widely from area to area, and was highest in the textile areas. However the report concluded that there had been a diminution in the employment of married women in textiles between 1881 and 1891: Estimated Minimun % of married & widowed women workers in selected towns @i[ Burnley Blackburn Preston Rochdale Oldham] 1881 22.1% 31.6% 23.8% 16.1% 12.0% 1891 22.1% 26.6% 18.7% 8.4% 2.8% Another investigator Margaret Hewitt {14}, examined household schedules for the Blackburn registration district in the censuses of 1851, 1871 and 1901. In 1851 24.14% of women cotton operatives in the district were married, with 0.87% widowed. The comparable figures for 1871 were 30.05% and 4.68%. However by 1901 the proportion of married women employees had fallen to 24.48%. Whichever measure is used - % of all married women in employment or % of employed women who are married - there was a decline at the end of the nineteenth century which continued into the twentieth century. This was certainly the conclusion of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws reporting in 190 (?) {15}: @i[ For the most part there is a growing tendency for married women to leave wage-earning and devote themselves to domestic labour. {16}] It was a tendency which was positively welcomed by those who in the early twentieth century were becoming concerned about maternal and child health. The Fabian influenced Minority Report on the Poor Laws argued that women with dependant children to care for should receive relief on condition that they did not seek employment: @i[ Whenever the State decides to provide for children's upbringing by leaving them in the mother's care, her service must be assumed (and required) to be devoted to them and not to wage earning. {17}] This condition was to be applied to single and widowed mothers seeking relief, and also to the wives of men on relief. Bad or inadequate mothers whose children were taken into State care would be expected to work. The assumption is that mothers only worked when economic necessity forced them to do so ; @i[ We have chosen so to organise the industrial world that the wife and children are normally supported by the industrial earnings of the husband and father,with the result that when women engage in industries their wages are habitually fixed at rates calculated to support themselves alone, without a family of children. If by some mischance the husband and father is withdrawn from the family group, the wife and mother is, with regard to self support, under a double impossibility. She cannot consistently with her legal obligation to rear her children properly, give her time and strength to wage earning to the extent that modern competitive industry demands; and even if she could do so she finds the woman's remuneration fixed on the basis of supporting one person, and not several. Hence it becomes practically indispensable ,as it is only equitable, that there should be afforded to the mother bereft of the man upon whom she had been encouraged to depend suitable public assistance, not so much for herself, as to enable her to bring up the children whom the community, though the breadwinner is withdrawn, still expects her to rear. {18}] The introduction of school meals and school medical inspections in (1908) were aspects of the conern in the period about the health and welfare of children. There was also concern about infant mortality rates. The Committee of the Dundee Social Union in 1904 found high rates of gastro-enteritis to be a cause of infant death, and put this down to improper feeding due to women returning to work. A study by Dr Templeman in the same area of Dundee in 1909 investigated 632 births, and found that 21.5% of the babies born to working mothers died under one year of age, compared to 18.2% of those born to occasional workers and 12.9% of the babies of non working mothers. {19} Reformers such as the Fabians were in the forefront of this concern. A Fabian Tract on "The Decline of the Birth Rate" in 1907 attributed the decline in births among the working classes to the 'inconvenience' of additional children in homes where the mother worked: @i[ To the vast majority of women, and especially to those of the fine type, the rearing of children would be the most attractive occupation, if it offered economic advantages equal to those, say, of school teaching or service in the post office.{20}] It was a view shared by H.G.Wells: @i[ So too the still monstrous absurdity of women discharging their supreme social function, bearing and rearing children in their spare time, as it were, while they 'earn their living' by contributing some half mechanised element to some trivial industrial product, will disappear.{21}] Similar views were shared by many of those further to the political left than the Fabians. The Marxist Social Democratic Federation also advocated restrictions on women's work and saw capitalism as responsible for forcing women to work. The radicals wanted women, especially mothers, out of paid employment but recognised that those who had to work would require an adequate income before this could happen. The more conservative were often not quite able to accept the payment to enable women not to work. The majority of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws were afraid that the granting of relief automatically to all unsupported mothers would destroy initiative and even encourage drinking and immorality. The trend away from married women working was thus being welcomed as a progressive development. Whether or not women heard or paid any attention to the experts, rates of employment did fall @section{National Insurance and Dependants Benefits} The national insurance schemes introduced in 1911 were only for 'workers' not merely because it was impractical to collect contributions from non employees, but because the contingencies provided for were ones applicable to those in employment. Benefit was specifically to 'tide over' the employee in times of unemployment or sickness. Towards the end of World War 1 the Government adopted a plan to pay short term "donations" to ex-servicemen for a period following demobilization. The donations included allowances for dependent children because they were modelled on the separation alllowances paid during the war to the wives and families of soldiers. When the war ended rather sooner than had been expected the "out of work donation" was extended to the civilian unemployed workers. The donation began on 25 November 1918 and was intended to run for 26 weeks for ex-service people and 13 weeks for civilians. Payments were 29 shillings for men, 25 shillings for women, 6 shillings for the first dependent child and 3 shillings for other children. The original payments for civilians were 4 shillings per week less but payments were equalised within a month of introduction. In 1919 the donation was extended for a further 13 weeks, with the rates of payment being 20 shillings for men and 15 shillings for women, with no children's allowances. The donation was temporarily renewed four times between 1919 and 1921. The Government feared the political consequences of throwing unemployed ex-Servicemen onto the Poor Law. However this produced a new problem because the ordinary unemployment benefit rate for both men and women were considerably lower being only 7 shillings in 1918, 11 shillings in 1919 and 15 shillings for men and 12 shillings for women in 1920. In March 1921 the out of work donation came to an end and ordinary benefit rates were raised to 20 shillings and 16 shillings but reduced again in June 1921 to 15 shillings and 12 shillings. Unemployment rates were high. The Government was under pressure to provide more adequately for the unemployed. The trade unions and Labour Party advocated benefits which were closely related to "need": @i[ The present rate of unemployment benefit is miserably inadequate. With such meagre rates of benefit, the unemployed workers and their families must sink into semi-starvation or worse ......{22}] From 1920 the Labour Party demand for "maintenance" was formulated as 40 shillings per week for a male or female head of household, 25 shillings for single men and women, with additional allowances for children.: @i[ ...benefit should have regard to the unemployed workers' obligations. The out of work donation scheme, which was instituted after the Armistice as a temporary measure, provides a precedent. In addition to a flat rate, unemployed workers received an additional allowance for dependents. {23}] In the autumn of 1921 the Government was afraid that there might be serious discontent when unemployment grew worse over the winter. Local authorities complained about the burden placed on ratepayers in high unemployment areas because of the need to pay Poor Relief in addition to unemployment benefit. On 6 October 1921 a Cabinet Committee was appointed: @i[ to consider the possibility of a special distress levy on employees and employers to form a distress fund to provide allowances for dependants of the unemployed.] On 11 October the Committee recommended a special distress fund to pay allowances for wives and children for a limited period in the first instance. The new benefit was paid from 10 November 1921, an addition to basic insurance benefit of 5 shillings for an adult dependant, and 1 shilling for each child. Selective increases for dependants were almost certainly adopted as a cheaper alternative to an all round benefit increase. The Government also had the example of Poor Relief to turn to. After the War local authorities increasingly used their 'exceptional' power to grant outdoor relief to the able bodied unemployed. Poor Law authorities granting outdoor relief did so on the basis of the needs of the family unit as a whole. @section{The Form Taken by Dependant's Benefits} The November 1921 Unemployed Workers Dependants' (Temporary Provision) Act, unlike the out-of-work donation, made provision not only for children but for certain adult dependants - wives, females living with a widower or unmarried man as a wife or for the purpose of taking care of his children, and dependant husbands. The Bill as originally drafted allowed women with children (but no husband) increases for their children, but women were not to receive increases for their husbands or children if they had husbands. This did not go unchallenged in the House of Commons: @i[ What about a grant to the working women who may have a husband dependant upon her? It is very often the case in working class families that the common position is reversed, and there are exceptions, so that if the husband is dependant upon the wife and upon her work her claim for a grant to support him is clearly as good as if the case were reversed and the wife were dependant on the resources of the husband.{24}] Vicountess Astor raised the specific problem of wives with invalid husbands. The Minister in reply to the debate promised to consider this at the Committee stage of the Bill, and an amendment was put forward to give the increase to a woman whose husband "is prevented by physical or mental infirmity from supporting himself and is being maintained wholly by his wife." @section{The Spread of Dependant's Benefits} When Contributory Pensions were under discussion in 1924 and 1925 therefore the device of providing for a wife as a dependant of her husband had already been adopted into the national isurance scheme. Thus a precedent had been set which enabled a solution to be provided to the problem of providing pensions for the 90% of married women not in employment. The Royal Commission on National Health Insurance which reported in 1926 favoured the introduction of dependants' allowances, again in part because this would be cheaper than an all-round increase in benefits. The Commission accepted the argument that it was wrong for benefits during sickness to be lower than those during unemployment, especially given that "the need for financial help must in general be greater in a period of ill health than in a period of unemployment of the same duration."{25} Increasing contributions had been ruled out which made the dependants allowance attractive. The other constraint was the result of the peculiarities of the Health Insurance scheme. The Fund had been divided into two, one fund for men and one for women, and the surplus of contributions over benefit payments was greater for the men than for the women: @i[ This disparity must influence very materially the question of extensions since, if rates of contributions are to remain unchanged, any extensions the charges for which fall equally on the men's and the woman's contributions must be limited by the smaller sum. On the other hand if an extension can be planned which falls mainly on the man's contribution, difficulty is avoided. It will be seen later that this consideration among others drives us to a scheme for dependants in preference to increases in the normal rate of benefit for all insured persons.{26}] The Commision considered what should be done about wives who were themselves wage earners. The increase to unemployment benefit was not paid for wives in regular wage earning employment or themselves in receipt of unemployment benefit.{27} The Royal Commission on Health Insurance concluded that: @i[ ...for Health Insurance purposes the wife should in all cases be regarded as dependant on her husband, and ... accordingly the additional allowance should always be paid in respect of the wife even where she is herself a wage earner.{28}] For administrative convenience, and because excluding such wives would unduly advantage Approved Societies in the areas where many married women did work, wives were to be treated as dependants in all cases. It was also recommended that benefit for children should be paid to men only. This was to apply even if the husband of an insured woman was not himself insured. It was to apply even to the children of unmarried women on the argument that it would save the need to investigate whether the child was being mantained by the father. In fact these proposals were not adopted, and Health Insurance remained without dependants' benefits until 1946. However the thinking of the Commission is a good example of the way in which the dependancy system evolved. Financial constraints, problems relating to the Approved Societies and the funding system were of crutial importance, demanding that improvement be simple to administer and cost little. The type of solution adopted, however, rested to a considerable extent on views about the financial relationships between husbands and wives and the secondary nature of married woman's earnings. Extending benefits to dependants were discussed by the Royal Commission in relation both to the cash sickness and disablement benefits, and the medical benefit ie payment for medical services. The two raise different issues, and indeed different attitudes could be and were taken. The extension of cash benefit to dependants remains a benefit for the insured person to enable him to provide for his family. Medical benefit to the family members would have been a benefit fot the family member him/herself since the receipt would have nothing to do with the state of health of the insured. The alternative to this latter extension was to establish a public medical service available to all citizens, insured or not, on free or means-tested basis. The Royal Commission favoured this, and therefore did not recommend medical benefits for dependants on the grounds that it might postpone the introduction of such a service. Had Medical benefit been extended to dependants some people would have remained uncovered, for example separated wives not working. If we visualise medical benefit as a 'voucher' to pay for medical treatment, we see the harshness of the exclusion of certain people from free medical treatment just because they happen not to be insured or the the dependants of an insured person. The 1925 Contributory Pensions scheme granted pensions to all wives of insured men once both husband and wife were aged 65. No distinction was drawn between wives earning and not earning. A wife could earn a pension in her own right, of practical importance if her husband was not insured or if she were older than her husband, but could not then receive both pensions. The amount paid to men and their wives was the same - 10 shillings. @section{Pensions For Widows} The Act which introduced contributory pensions in 1925 also provided for pensions for the widows of insured men, whatever their financial position and family responsibilities. In the original 1911 proposals for national insurance there was provision for widows' and childrens' benefits, but these were dropped at an early stage, apparently because of opposition from friendly societies and industrial assurance companies. During the war wives and children received separation allowances, and pensions were granted to war widows and their children. It was this which provided a stimulus for proposals for pensions for civilian widows, and indeed other mothers. There was considerable criticism of Poor Law treatment of unsupported mothers, not merely because of the stigma of "going on the parish", and the inadequacy of the relief given, but also because relief was frequently dependent on the moral character of the woman and her capacity as a mother. The Majority Report of the 1909 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, which had suggested that women, widows or otherwise, seeking relief should be carefully categorised. The "slovenly and the slipshod women of weak intentions and often of weak health" and "the really bad mothers, people guilty of wilful neglect, sometimes drunkards or of immoral character" would have their children taken into care, in the latter case completely but in the former case perhaps on a 'daily boarding' basis. In 1919 the new Ministry of Health met some of the criticisms of Poor Law provision for mothers and children in a report entitled "A Survey of Relief to Widows and Children". {29} The Report warned that: @i[ It should be borne in mind that in many cases where widows apply for relief, there are defects of character, temperament or practical capacity, which may render it difficult or impossible for them, even with monetary assistance, to rear and train their children properly.] There was great reluctance to help deserted wives: @i[ The strictest investigation is required in all cases where relief is applied to desertion, as there is an obvious danger of collusion between the husband and wife. Every effort should be made to trace the deserting husband, and if he can be found steps should be taken to enforce the penalties provided by the law against him.] The report also stressed that Guardians could exercise their discretion to give relief where husbands were sick, although the need to stress this undoubtedly arose from the fact that in some areas outdoor relief was refused. Poor Law Guardians were empowered to treat the wives of long-term invalid husbands like widows. In the immediate post-war period a number of organisations proposed that there should be "pensions for mothers". This particular form of words was frequently in use, sometimes meaning the same as "pensions for widows" but often having a wider meaning. The Family Endowment Society began its campaign in 1919, with a policy of extending the wartime 'separation allowance' to all mothers with young children. The Society proposed an allowance of 12/6 a week for the mother, with 5/- for the first child and 3/6 for each subsequent child. That this would have been a substantial benefit is illustrated by the fact that old age pensions were raised from 5/- to 10/- per week in 1919, and that unemployment and sickness benefits were paid at the rate of 11/-. Virtually all mothers, supported or not, would have been eligible, although the Society's members had some disagreement over whether unmarried mothers should qualify, for fear that this would encourage illegitimacy. The Ministry of Health "Survey of Relief for Widows & Children" included an extract from a 1918 Local Government Board Report on "Mother's Pensions" in the United States. These "mother's pensions" were separate from the American poor law system, although still means tested. In a few States the pensions were restricted to widows, but in several they were paid to women whose husbands were disabled, physically or mentally, and in a few States they were granted to divorced or deserted mothers. The issue was of sufficient topicality for the TUC and the Labour Party to issue a joint report on "Motherhood and Child Endowment" in 1921. The Report was unfavourable to proposals for endowment for fear that such a system might lead to lower wages. The Committee approved existing party policy: @i[ Up to the present time the Labour Party has accepted as the ordinary method of providing for a family that the father shall be responsible for securing the income.] During unemployment or sickness benefits tailored to family needs should be provided. However where the father was dead, invalided or in desertion, the Committee then approved the provision of a pension. Other requirements of mothers and their children could be met by greater provision of services such as a health service, free education, milk, school meals and so on. The Committee's report was opposed by a minority (the vote was 206 to 49) of women delegates at the 1922 National Conference of Labour Women: @i[ In turning down the possibility of national family endowment so easily and with so little consideration, the Committee had possibly been influenced by a sort of subconscious predjudice almost always in the minds of men when they considered woman's problems. The feeling at the back of their minds was that they did not like their wives to have direct control over the money to spend on themselves, what the men liked was that the women and children should be solely dependant on their (the men's) wages).{30}] In 1920 a Private Member's Bill "to provide pensions for women and children" obtained a second reading. {31} Those eligible were to be widows with children, deserted or legally separated wives with children and mothers with a husband "unable, through illness or incapacity, or through being an invalid, adequately to maintain such wife and children. 'Widow' was to include a woman who had been living with a man as his wife. The Bill did not suceed but in the following session another Bill with a similar title was introduced, but this failed to obtain a second reading and was not printed, so its content does not survive {32}. According to Alba Gordon writing in 1924 {33} the 1921 Bill proposed pensions for widows and the wives of invalid husbands. These proposals were for non-contributory pensions on the 1908 old age pensions model. During the early 1920s there were several published proposals for improvements in social insurance. T.T. Broad's "An 'All-In' National Insurance Scheme" in 1923 proposed a widow's pension as part of an insurance scheme. This scheme attracted considerable publicity at the time, as did William Beveridge's "Insurance for All and Everything" in 1924. Beveridge stated that only provision for widowhood need be seriously considered within his scheme: @i[ In the present summary review the only interruption of earnings by motherhood that need to be considered at any length is widowed motherhood. Maternity itself is fairly well covered under health insurance. The unmarried mother raises problems which are difficult but not common. The interruption of earning that occurs when a working woman marries and devotes herself to bringing up a family is or should be automatically provided for so long as the husband lives, either earning or drawing benefit when for any cause his own earning ceases. The main gap still to be filled in our social insurance is provision for the case where the breadwinner dies leaving a widow with yound children. There is another gap of less importance, represented by the widow without dependants but past the age of earning, say 65 or more.{34}] A 1924 Fabian Society pamphlet, "Social Insurance:What it is and what it might be" {35}, favoured the retention of a non-contributory old age pension although administered by one single social insurance body together with all other benefits. This also advocated a contributory 'mother's pension' to be paid to widows with children. Another 1924 publication was "Social Insurance Unified" by Joseph L. Cohen. This advocated a more comprehensive contributory insurance scheme, but conceded that where 'mother's pensions' were concerned this might not be appropriate and recommended that such pensions be paid in a non-contributory basis so as to reach all those in need. The "mothers" to be included were widows, deserted or legally separated wives, wives of men rendered unable through illness adequately to maintain their wives and children, and women who had been habitually living as wives and whose partners had died. Cohen favoured placing limitations on the ability of women receiving such pensions to enter paid employment, both on the ground that this was harmful to the children, and on the ground that women with pensions would form a cheap labour pool pulling down the general level of wages. There was therefore a fairly widespread recognition that to cover all mothers in need a non-contributory scheme would be best. Most of the proposals for 'mother's pensions' saw such pensions as being something a woman became entitled to in her own right. The choice to make widow's pensions part of the contributory insurance scheme inevitably restricted receipt of benefit to those who were in insured employment. Since, as we have seen, over 90% of all married women were not in employment this meant provision for the wives of insured men. In fact the Act provided widow's pensions only if the husband had been an insured contributor. During the debate on the 1925 Contributory Pensions Bill Ellen Wilkinson suggested that women insured in their own right should be able to receive a widow's pension if their husband died. This was not taken up, presumably on the basis that the pension was to compensate the woman for the loss of support from the husband, not to assist her with the problems of being a sole parent. It might have been possible to provide in this way for deserted wives, but in the end benefit was restricted to widows who were seen as the most in need, and the most deserving. Thus from 1925 on widows were provided for because they had insured husbands, not because 'widowhood' as such was seen as deserving of financial support. The various proposals for 'mother's pensions' on a non-contributory basis were effectively killed by the introduction of the 1925 Act. The process of pushing this concept aside until forgotten is illustrated by successive annual conferences of Labour Women. In 1922 'mother's pensions' were discussed, and were accepted for widow's, deserted wives and wives with invalid husbands, with only a minority favouring pensions for all women. In 1923 there was a resolution calling for "endowment of motherhood" by way of a pension to all mothers "irrespective of the husband's earnings" with "full maintenance for widows." A resolution calling for pensions for civilian widows attracted amendments calling for the replacement of 'widows' by 'mothers'. Yet another resolution called for: @i[ ... such readjustment of the economic structure as shall secure to the mother of dependent children the direct control of a money income proportionate to their family obligation.] In 1924 a resolution called for a non-contributory pension for widows with children or mothers whose husbands were incapacitated. Amendments were proposed to include 'deserted wives', 'unmarried mothers and mother's pensions in general' and 'childless widows'. In 1925 there were Conference resolutions protesting at the exclusion from the 1925 Bill of mothers with incapacitated husbands, as well as at the insurance based nature of the proposed scheme. In addition there were resolutions calling for pensions for deserted wives and for widows with grown up children. By the 1926 Conference the majority of resolutions were concerned with the inadequency of the 1925 Act, with only one repeating the claims of wives of invalid husbands and one calling for "endowment of motherhood on a non- contributory basis". Later conferences in the 1920s and 1930s discussed children's allowances, and the anomalies often thrown up by the contributory widow's pension scheme, but the idea of non-contributory 'mother's pensions' literally disappears from the political agenda. The Family Endowment Society continued to campaign, but changed its focus to campaign for 'children's allowances'. There was clearly a great deal of opposition to the provision of 'mother's pensions', especially to payment to all women, not just those unsupported by a man. Provision on a non-contributory basis would have been expensive and therefore unacceptable to the Governments of the day. It would be an over- exaggeration to suggest that the alternative path of non-contributory mother's pensions might have been taken. However the debate of the period illustrates that choices did exist and there were alternatives to the contributory insurance scheme adopted. The point to be stressed here is that once an insurance scheme was adopted certain constraints were inevitable. In particular many women in need would be excluded from benefit. From 1925 therefore not only were wives to receive a pension as dependants of their husbands, so also were widows. Under an insurance scheme the only alternative to provision as dependants would have been no provision at all for the vast majority of women who married. @section{Towards Comprehensive Social Insurance} Between 1925 and World War II Britain had three insurance schemes, each with different rules and administration - one to cover unemployment, one health and one pensions for the retired and widows. In addition the non-contributory pension scheme provided for those over 70. From the very beginnings of the national insurance scheme women were perceived as a problem. One of the civil servants involved in the planning stages of the 1911 scheme in his memoirs commented: @i[ Whenever the women were talked of, they were thought of as unsatisfactory. They are not insurable risks. {36}] The problems of fitting women into the national insurance scheme receive considerable coverage in his memoirs, which were admittedly written with hindsight, and may not have been entirely accurate. {37} In the first draft of the health insurance scheme it was proposed theat contributions and benefits for women be lower than for men. There was discussion of what should happen when women dropped out of employment on marriage. Consideration was given to the payment of a 'dowry' to the women in respect of their contributions. The actuaries advised that this would be too expensive. Later it was argued that women in insurance should be eligible for maternity benefit. The proposal for a 'marriage dowry' was revived in discussions on a National Insurance Bill in 1917, but rejected. In 192? special provisions were introduced for married women leaving employment within a year of marriage. If a married woman had 8 consecutive weeks out of employment, apart from illness, she was to be placed in a special class of insured women - "Class K" - entitling her to limited benefits, namely 6 weeks sickness or disablement at a reduced rate within the next year, a year's medical benefit, and maternity benefit for one child during the next 2 years. This scheme was discussed by the Royal Commision on Health Insurance which reported in 1926. The Commission took the view that it was right to treat married women differently from other contributors. Other contributors (and married women who stayed in employment for a year after marriage) on leaving employment received 12 months free insurance which could be extended following illness during that period. It was felt that married women could use this system to extend insurance cover far beyond the 12 months period. {38} In 1932 the approved societies tried to persuade the Government to create a new class of insurance for all married women. They proposed that on marriage a woman would have to requalify for health insurance by paying 26 weekly contributions, as if they were new entrants, while being excluded from maternity benefit for a year and disability benefit for two years. The societies alleged that many women were posing as 'unemployed' in order to receive health insurance benefits, while in fact having permanently left the labour force. Their evidence for this was that, whereas in the year 1925/6 11.6% of insured women had left insurance, in the year 1930/1 only 6.6% of insured women dropped out. Their proposal was opposed by the Conservative Women MPs as well as by the Labour Party, and was defeated in the House of Commons. Nearly all the proposals for special treatment of married women arose from the belief that they made excessive claims for benefit. Before health insurance was introduced there was little experience on which to draw. Estimates were made of likely sickness rates from the actuarial tables of the Manchester Unity Friendly Society, which contained skilled men only. Ten per cent was added to these figures for men since unskilled men would be included, with a further 10% added to produce the estimate for women's sickness. Benefit rates for women were set lower than those for men, but contributions were also lower, and so the actuaries proposed a 3-day waiting period before benefit was paid. This was seen as providing a further margin of safety for women in particular, since it was believed that women had a greater likelihood of short-term illness. Concern about 'excess' claims from both men and women arose during the first year of the scheme. A Departmental Committee reported on this in 1914. {39} It concluded that as far as men were concerned most excessive payments could be attributed to lax administration {40}, but saw the problem for women to be more complex. The Committee itself tended to discuss 'women' as a group, but the figures quoted show that married women were the real problem group. Up to October 1913 claims per head were 2.74d per insured man, 3.06d per insured married women but only 1.54d per insured single woman. The Committee considered several explanations for the excess claims from women, including their alleged ignorance of insurance, the fact that the benefit available was closer to average female wages than was male benefit to average male earnings, the possibility that they stayed longer on benefit than men because of the opportunity to catch up on housework {41}, the fact that women were less dependant than men on earnings and could more easily do without full wages, and the illnesses associated with pregnancy. However the Committee concluded that the main cause was that the woman had a higher incidence of sickness than expected, and that most of this was genuine. The 'problem' receded during the War, largely because contributions rose, due to increased employment, and sickness benefit claims dropped. The Royal Commission on Health Insurance in 1926 did not view excessive claims from women as a problem. However the actuaries reporting to the Commission claimed that the problem had not disappeared, stating that sickness claims of unmarried women were higher than those of men and that the claims of married women were double those of single women. The issue did not become of importance again until the Health Insurance Fund was in financial difficulties in the early 1930s. In 1932 benefits for married women were reduced. Contemporary commentators in the inter-war period also perceived a 'problem' relating to women in unemployment insurance. Of the 2( million persons insured in 1911 for unemployment, only 10,000 were women. In 1919 609,000 women were insured, with more coming into insurance when it was extended in 1920 to cover all manual workers and low paid non-manual workers, with the exception of agricultural and domestic workers. The main problem which was discussed was that of knowing whether women really were 'unemployed', particularly when they were married. Women were originally eligible to claim the post-war 'out-of-work donation'. In 1919 a rule was introduced that a married woman supported by her husband should not normally be considered eligible for donation. Women were thought to make unjustified claims for this donation. In the 1930s as unemployment rose, married women claimants came under increasing attack. In April 1930 the Ministry of Labour claimed that relaxation of conditions by the Labour Government in 1929 had produced most of the increase, alleging in particular that: @i[ Hundreds and thousands of married women who had not worked in factories for eight or ten years made application, but it did not follow that they received benefit. It meant that they increased the figures temporarily.{42) ] The Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance reporting in 193 ? pointed out that married women were between 45% and 50% of all female beneficiaries, while being only 25% to 30% of all insured women. In its first Report the Royal Commission proposed that married people and single people living at home should be ineligible for the 'transitional' benefit paid after insurance benefit had been exhausted. Later in the 1930s this benefit was placed on a fully means tested basis under a national 'Unemployment Assistance Board'. This had the effect of excluding many married men and women. Following the Royal Commision's first Report the 'Anomolies Regulations' were introduced, under which a married woman {43} who had paid less than 15 contributions since the marriage was required to satisfy two additional conditions before receiving benefit. First she had to show that she was normally employed in insurable employment and secondly: @i[ ..that having regard to all the circumstances of her case and in particular to the industrial experience and the industrial circumstances of the district in which she resides she can reasonably expect to obtain insurable employment in the district.] When social insurance came to be unified after World War II this was against a background of concern about the 'problem' which married women in particular presented to both sickness and unemployment insurance. @section{The Beveridge Scheme} After World War II national insurance was based largely on the Beveridge Plan. Beveridge dealt specifically with the position of women. In this, as in other respects, his 'Plan' was no new invention, but drew largely on the decisions and discussions of the inter-war years. Beveridge sought to overcome the problems discussed above which married women posed to health and unemployment insurance. He also wished to resolve the problem of providing a contributory pension for married womem. Between 1911 and 1946 married women paid contributions if they were in insurable employment and therefore qualified for benefit. As discussed this was felt to give rise to excessive claims, since a relatively short period of employment could qualify the woman for benefit. Contributory pensions involved a different problem since it was felt to be necessary that people should contibute for a reasonably long period, otherwise the contributory principle would be a sham. The 1925 scheme overcame the problems partly by granting benefit after a fairly short period of contribution and partly by providing for married women through their husbands' contributions. One of Beveridge's aims was to place the contributory pension scheme on a properly contributory footing, with contributions being required for most of a person's working life. There were 'transitional' provisions for those who were near to retirement age. Married women were expected to find it difficult to meet these contribution requirements, therefore the device of providing for them through their husbands' contributions was essential. Given that a small number of contributions paid intermittently would not qualify a married woman for pension, any contributions actually paid could be seen as'wasted' since she would receive a pension through her husband anyway. Therefore Beveridge proposed that married woman who did not work be exempted from the insurance scheme. This also went a long way towards elimimating the alleged problem of excessive claims for sickness and unemployment benefit. Beveridge argued that married women were not in real need even if unemployed or sick: @i[ To most married women earnings are a means, not of subsistence, but of living above subsistence. In sickness or unemployment the housewife does not need compensating benefits on the same scale as the solitary woman.{44} ] Beveridge considered the economic position of married women to be so different that they should be treated as a completely separate insurance class: @i[ Most married women have worked at some gainful occupation before marriage; most who have done so give up that occupation on marriage or soon after; all women by marriage acquire a new economic and social status, with risks and rights different from those of the unmarried. On marriage a woman gains a legal right to maintainance by her husband as a first line of defence against risks which fall directly on the solitary women; she undertakes at the same time to perform vital unpaid service and becomes exposed to new risks, including the risk that her married life may be ended prematurely by widowhood or separation. {45}] On the available statistics it was reasonable to conclude that most married women did not enter paid employment. The 1931 Census had shown only a small increase in the proportion of married women at work, at 10.3%(check) over 8.73% in 1921. Many more married women were in employment during World War II. In 1931 16% of women in employment were married {46} but in 1943 43% of the female workforce was married.{47} It was widely believed that most would leave the workforce as had happened in 1918, although in fact this did not happen and the proportion of married women in the female workforce remained at 43% {48}.Beveridge not only noted that most married women were not in employment, but also believed that they ought not to work. He was concerned about the falling birth rate. He proposed a special 'Housewife's policy': @i[ The principle adopted here is that on marriage every woman begins a new life in relation to social insurance. She acquires at once under a Housewife's Policy, endorsed on or attached to her previous insurance document, a right to the benefits and grants set out in the plan under Marriage needs. She does not carry on rights to employment and disability benefit in respect of contributions before marriage. {49}] On marriage a woman would recive a 'marriage grant' to compensate for the loss of previous contributions. The benefits acquired under the section of the plan entitled 'marriage needs' were those benefits a woman would receive while her husband was sick, unemployed or retired, maternity benefit if she were in paid employment, and household help during sickness. If the woman was employed she would have the option of paying contributions but receiving reduced benefits, or of being exempted from contribution. If she chose to pay her insurance record would start from her date of marriage. The Government did not accept all of Beveridge's proposals on women. In paticular the proposal for re-starting women's insurance on marriage was rejected, partly as a result of complaints from areas where considerable numbers of women went on working after marriage. The proposal for a 'marriage grant' also disappeared, since it was to have been paid in recognition of lost contributions. The idea of a fresh start was retained in an attenuated form for qualification for retirement pensions. The married woman's contributions before marriage were not to count towards retirement pension, and in order to qualify for any pension at all in her own right she was required to have paid or been credited with contributions for at least half the years between her marriage and the age of 60. Other Beveridge proposals were also rejected including that for household assistance during the married woman's own sickness, and that for a benefit for separated wives, provided they were the innocent party. The latter benefit was felt to involve a social security authority in the undesirable area of investigating matrimonial guilt and innocence. The Government did accept the suggestion that married women be given the choice of whether or not to contribute.